WilliamLam.com

Verify Hypervisor-Assisted Guest Mitigation (Spectre) patches using PowerCLI

by // 80 Comments

VMware recently published a new knowledge base (KB) article 52085 that outlines instructions for enabling the Hypervisor-Assisted Guest Mitigation (CVE-2017-5715), also known as the Spectre vulnerability. This KB also provides steps to verify the updated microcode (included in the ESXi patch) has been applied along with Virtual Machine verification (those applicable) to ensure that they are seeing the new CPU features. While following the KB and patching one of my vSphere environments, I had noticed the verification steps was not only manual but it also to difficult to scale beyond a few VMs as it required customers to look for a specific set of strings from within the vmware.log file which is generated for each powered on VM, which could easily be several hundreds or thousands of VMs.

I figured there had to be a better way to help customers automate this at scale and remove the human factor. The other reason I was not fond of the current method is that it would require customers to either enable ESXi Shell/SSH access or to manually or through automation to download every single vmware.log file to inspect for specific log entries which can take quite a bit of time for any sizable environment. I had an idea on how this could be done without having to look at the vmware.log file while leveraging our vSphere APIs and did some investigation. Before proceeding further, please familiarize yourself with KB 52085. For complete background on both Spectre (CVE-2017-5753 & CVE-2017-5715) and Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) as it relates to all VMware products, please carefully read through this top level KB 52245 which is being updated as new information is available, so you may want to subscribe to the KB for all the latest updates.

UPDATE 4 (01/23/18) - VMware has just updated KB 52345 with the current list of Intel CPUs affected by Intel Sightings. I have also updated my script to reflect all these changes. Make sure to download the latest version to ensure you have the latest changes.

UPDATE 3 (01/16/18) - I have just enhanced the script further to also collect the current microcode version running on a given ESXi host. Unfortunately, this information can only be collected when SSH is enabled and is something a user must explicitly allow. The benefit here is that Intel Sighting impact reporting is more robust as the code now checks for both impacted CPU signature as well as the microcode affected by Intel Sighting as outline in KB 52345. See below for more details.

UPDATE 2 (01/14/18) - As mentioned in the last update, I have been working on a Intel Sighting remediation script which can help customers automate the temporary workaround as recommended in KB 52345. Please see this blog post for complete details.

UPDATE 1 (01/13/18) - VMware just published a new KB 52345 outlining certain Intel Broadwell and Haswell CPUs being affected by Intel Sightings after applying latest microcode updates. Please refer to the KB for the complete details. I am currently working on a script to help with the remediation as the remediation method outlined in the KB would require customers to enable SSH access and manually update /etc/vmware/config. In the meantime, I wanted to provide a way for customers to easily identify whether their system are affected by Intel Sightings and thanks to community member Adam Robinson who just submitted a patch this morning to update my existing script to include these details. I have also added the CPU model to the output as additional information.

Note: This script only provides information about your existing vSphere environment, it does not make any changes or provides any remediation steps, please follow the KB for those instructions.

The PowerCLI script is called VerifyESXiMicrocodePatch.ps1 and it contains the following two functions:

  • Verify-ESXiMicrocodePatchAndVM
  • Verify-ESXiMicrocodePatch

[Read more...]

Tip from Engineering - Use UEFI firmware for Windows 10 & Server 2016

by // 15 Comments

Several weeks back I was chatting with a few of our Engineers from the Core Platform Team (vSphere) and they had shared an interesting tidbit which I thought I was worth mentioning to my readers. When creating a Virtual Machine in either vSphere or Fusion/Workstation, customers have the option to override the default and specify the specific Firmware boot option whether that is BIOS or UEFI.


Like most customers, I do not even bother touching this setting and I just assume the system defaults are sufficient. Interestingly, for Microsoft Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, there are some important implications to be aware of on whether BIOS or UEFI is used. This is especially important since the default firmware type in vSphere for these OSes are BIOS.

UPDATE (01/07/21) - As of vSphere 6.7 Update 3, the default firmware for creating a Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 guest OS is now EFI

[Read more...]

Auditing/Logging vCenter Server authentication & authorization activities

by // 1 Comment

Recently, I have seen an increase in the number of requests from our field and customers inquiring about logging various vCenter Server authentication and authorization activities. The topics vary from identifying which log files contain which activities to to why some of this information is not available in the vCenter Server Events UI or why they are available else where. In most of these cases, customers were also looking for a way to forward these activities to their remote syslog infrastructure for auditing and tracking purposes whether that is using vRealize Log Insight (which all vSphere customers get 25 free OSI licenses!) or some other logging solution.

Having explored this topic lightly in the past and given the amount of interests, I thought I would dive a bit deeper and look at some of the common authentication and authorization workflows and provide examples of what the log entries look like and where you can find them. However, before jumping right in, I think is is worth spending a few minutes looking at the history of authentication (commonly referred to as AuthN) and authorization (commonly referred to as AuthZ) for vCenter Server and where we had started from and where we are at today to give you the full context.

UPDATE (04/08/19) - Please take a look at this blog post here for all new auditing enhancements in vSphere 6.7 Update 2 which simplifies the consumption of vCenter and vCenter SSO auditing events.

History of vCenter Server AuthN/AuthZ

Prior to vSphere 5.1, vCenter Server handled both Authentication (AuthN) and Authorization (AuthZ). As a Client, you would connect directly to vCenter Server and the AuthN service will verify who you are whether that is a local account on the OS or an Active Directory user which required vCenter Server to be joined to your AD Domain. Once you have been authenticated, the AuthZ service will then take over and verify the privileges you have been assigned to perform specific operations within vCenter Server.


In vSphere 5.1, a new service was introduced called Single Sign-On (SSO) which now takes over for AuthN services from vCenter Server. Once authenticated, it will then allow you to connect to the vCenter Server which then handles AuthZ activities


Although it may not be apparent, one major implication is where are successful and failed authentications being logged? In the past, these would reside within vCenter Server since it handled both AuthN/Authz activities, vCenter Server even included specific authentication Events that can then be seen using the UI and/or API. However, with SSO in the picture, authentication is no longer in vCenter Server but with SSO. This is why when you have a failed login using the vSphere Web Client (Flex/H5) UI it does not show up in vCenter Server and it because the logging is done but within the SSO service (which now resides in the Platform Services Controller for more recent vCenter releases).

[Read more...]